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ABSTRACT 
 
 Childhood maltreatment increases risk for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 
Maladaptive patterns of attention to threat-related stimuli warrant examination as possible 
contributing risk factors. It remains unclear whether persistent threat-processing biases are 
differentially apparent in adults who were maltreated as children and either did, or did not, 
develop later PTSD. The present study examined associations among attention bias, childhood 
maltreatment, and PTSD in adults. We hypothesized that attentional bias toward threat 
significantly mediates associations between childhood maltreatment and adult PTSD symptoms. 
183 adults with and without childhood maltreatment histories participated in this study, which 
involved completion of a range of clinical measures; attention bias was measured by the Dot 
Probe task. We found that attention bias toward happy faces partially mediated the relationship 
between childhood maltreatment and PTSD avoidance and numbing symptoms. Childhood 
 maltreatment, happy face attention bias, and perceived racially discriminative experiences all 
accounted for significant variance in PTSD symptoms. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Emotion processing, Childhood 
maltreatment, Dot Probe, Attention bias 
 
 
 EMOTION PROCESSING IN ADULT SURVIVORS OF CHILDHOOD MALTREATMENT   
 
 
by 
 
 
NEGAR FANI 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts  
in the College of Arts and Sciences  
Georgia State University  
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Negar Fani 
2009 
 
 
 
 EMOTION PROCESSING IN ADULT SURVIVORS OF CHILDHOOD MALTREATMENT   
 
 
by 
 
 
 
       NEGAR FANI 
 
 
 
 
 
Committee Chair: Erin B. McClure Tone 
 
          Committee: Rebekah Bradley 
   Page Anderson 
  
 
   
Electronic Version Approved: 
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
August 2009 
 
                                                                                                                                                        iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES v 
LIST OF FIGURES vi 
   1.  Introduction 1 
Emotion Processing Theories of Anxiety and PTSD 4 
Bias in Early Stages of Information Processing in Anxiety 6 
Attentional Bias in PTSD 9 
Impact of Early Life Trauma on Emotional Information Processing 16 
Childhood Maltreatment and Processing of Emotion in Facial Expressions 18 
Summary 21 
   2.  Methods 22 
Participants and Procedure 22 
Measures 24 
Data Analysis 27 
Power Analysis 29 
3. Results 29 
Mediational Analyses 29 
Exploratory Analyses  31 
4. Discussion 34 
REFERENCES 41 
APPENDIXES 
Appendix A: Figures 49 
Appendix B: Tables 53
  
v
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Demographics and Clinical Characteristics                                                          53 
Table 2 Intercorrelations Among Attention Bias Scores and Clinical Measures               54 
 
Table 3 Childhood Physical Abuse is Not Associated with Attention Bias for Happy      55 
 
Faces  
 
Table 4 Childhood Sexual Abuse is Not Associated with Attention Bias for Happy         56 
 
Faces  
Table 5 Attention Bias for Happy faces is Associated with Severe Childhood                  57 
 Emotional Abuse   
Table 6 Childhood Maltreatment Predicts Attention Bias Toward Happy Faces 58 
 
Table 7 PTSD Avoidance and Numbing Symptoms Predict Attention Bias Toward        59 
 Happy Faces  
 
Table 8 Childhood Maltreatment, Perceived Racial Discrimination, Attention                 60 
Bias for Threatening Faces and the Interaction Between Perceived Racial  
Discrimination and Threat Bias Predicts Total PTSD Symptoms  
Table 9 Childhood Maltreatment, Racial Discrimination and Attention Bias for              61 
Happy Faces Predicts Total PTSD Symptoms 
vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Attention Bias as a Mediator of the Relationship Between Childhood                 49 
 Maltreatment and PTSD   
Figure 2 Attention Bias for Happy Faces as a Mediator of the Relationship Between        50 
 
Childhood Maltreatment and Total PTSD Symptoms  
 
Figure 3 Attention Bias for Happy Faces as a Mediator of the Relationship Between        51 
 
Childhood Maltreatment and PTSD Avoidance and Numbing Symptoms 
Figure 4 Interaction of Perceived Racial Discrimination and Threat Bias is Associated    52 
 
with Total PTSD Symptoms  
 
1 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Maltreatment in early childhood, in the forms of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse, has 
become increasingly prevalent (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).  
Childhood maltreatment is associated with a variety of negative outcomes, including drug and 
alcohol abuse, physical health problems, and risky sexual behavior (Repetti, Taylor & Seeman, 
2002). Children who have experienced early life trauma also demonstrate greater vulnerability to 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), both in the immediate aftermath of childhood trauma and 
in the context of adverse events that occur later in development (Bremner et al., 1993; Golier et 
al., 2003).   
 PTSD is a complex psychological disorder with debilitating social and occupational 
consequences. PTSD may develop in response to perceived trauma and is characterized by four 
types of symptoms: 1) re-experiencing of the traumatic event, 2) avoidance of trauma-related 
stimuli, 3) emotional numbing, and 4) heightened levels of physiological arousal (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). Prevalence estimates for this disorder have varied across 
nationwide samples. Kessler and colleagues (1995) found that 60.7% of men and 51.2% of 
women who participated in the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS) had experienced lifetime 
trauma and 7.8% of the sample had developed lifetime PTSD (10.4% of women, 5% of men; 
(Kessler et al., 1995). A recent study of an urban primary care population found that 34% of 
participants met diagnostic criteria for lifetime PTSD and 23% met criteria for current PTSD 
(Liebschutz et al., 2007). Clearly, with prevalence estimates in the United States that range from 
8 to 34%, PTSD constitutes a major public health concern.  
However, epidemiological studies also demonstrate that despite high rates of trauma 
exposure in the general population, only a minority of individuals who have experienced 
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traumatic events develop PTSD (Kessler et al., 1995). It remains unclear what elevates risk for 
the disorder in this subset of individuals. Considerable research has focused on trauma-related 
factors as risk markers. In survivors of maltreatment for instance, prolonged exposure to and lack 
of control over the traumatic stressor, high levels of peri-traumatic dissociation, and greater 
violations of personal integrity have been discussed as factors that may contribute to poorer 
outcomes (Kendall-Tackett, Williams & Finkelhor, 1993; Spaccarelli 1994). Further, trauma 
inflicted by humans rather than by objects or natural forces may lead to greater distress and 
worse long-term outcomes (Vogel & Vernberg, 1993).   
Intrapersonal factors, such as information processing styles, may also contribute to risk 
for maladaptive responses to trauma. Studies of adults with PTSD have found, for example, that 
negative initial cognitive appraisals of one’s own symptoms following a trauma are linked to 
chronicity of symptoms (Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers, 1999). Further, neuropsychological findings 
suggest that adults who have endured trauma and developed PTSD demonstrate biases in various 
types of information processing, including attention, cue interpretation, and memory, when 
compared with trauma survivors who did not develop PTSD (for a review, see Vasterling & 
Brailey, 2005). Similar studies of information processing conducted in children who have 
endured interpersonal trauma have yielded evidence that attentional and interpretive biases 
characterize members of this population as well (Pine et al., 2005; Pollak et al., 2000).  
 While distinct lines of research indicate biased information processing in adults with 
PTSD and in maltreated children, no published studies to date have explicitly examined 
relationships among childhood maltreatment, adult PTSD, and patterns of information 
processing, particularly attentional biases. Such research may be especially important in light of 
evidence that early life trauma has marked and enduring effects on developing information-
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processing styles, behavioral responses, and physiology (Heim et al., 1997; Repetti, Taylor & 
Seeman, 2002; Salmon & Bryant, 2002; Cicchetti & Curtis, 2006). Given that only some 
individuals who are traumatized during childhood develop disorders such as PTSD, clarification 
of characteristics, such as patterns of attention that distinguish them from other traumatized 
peers, may provide a first step toward elucidating factors that increase vulnerability to 
psychopathology.  
Previous studies of attention in PTSD have yielded interesting findings; however, the 
populations studied and methods employed limit the ecological validity and generalizability of 
these findings. One widely used attention task, the Stroop paradigm, has significant limitations in 
that it is not designed to permit directional examination of attention bias and requires verbal, as 
well as reading, skill. Existing studies have also focused heavily on samples of combat veterans, 
who represent only one subgroup of individuals with PTSD (McNally et al., 1990; McNally,  
English & Lipke, 1993; Kaspi, McNally & Amir, 1995; Vrana, Roodman & Beckham,  1995).  
The proposed study is therefore designed to examine performance on a more precise and 
ecologically valid measure of attentional bias in a heterogeneous sample of adults with and 
without PTSD. More specifically, the goal of this study is to examine associations among 
attention to threat-related visual cues, childhood maltreatment, and current PTSD 
symptomatology. The primary hypothesis is that associations between childhood maltreatment 
and PTSD symptomatology are significantly mediated by the presence of attention bias. As 
research on attentional patterns in adult survivors of childhood maltreatment is limited and thus 
precludes formulation of directional hypotheses, exploratory analyses will examine potential 
differences in direction of bias among participants in this sample.   
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To provide background for the proposed study, this manuscript opens with a review of 
emotion-processing theories of PTSD, as well as models of early-stage information processing 
bias in anxiety, all of which provide a rationale for a focus on visual attention biases.  A 
discussion of the existing literature on attention bias in PTSD follows, along with a review of 
childhood maltreatment research as it pertains to emotion processing bias.         
Emotion Processing Theories of Anxiety and PTSD 
 Peter Lang, a prominent emotion theorist, highlights the crucial role of visual 
representations in triggering emotional responses, particularly fear. According to Lang (1977), 
visual images not only represent feared stimuli, but also hold information about their meaning 
(Lang, 1977). Additionally, they can signal the physiological responses that stimuli are likely to 
elicit. In this way Lang introduces the notion of an emotional image as a “propositional 
construct”—a rich, multifaceted cognitive structure that includes both visual and behavioral 
elements.  He states that while the visual presentation of a feared stimulus is likely to bring about 
a strong fear response, asking an individual to imagine the stimulus can elicit an equally 
powerful response. Via the real or imagined stimulus’s links to other types of content, such as 
meaning and expected behavior, it plays an active role in eliciting fear.  
Foa and Kozak (1986) elaborate on the “propositional construct” described in Lang’s 
conceptual analysis, differentiating pathological and adaptive responses to emotionally charged 
images. Specifically, they postulate that, depending on whether the constellation of relationships 
among stimulus, physiological response, and internalized meaning—the “fear structure”— is 
adaptive or pathological, it can lead to either realistic or inaccurate and exaggerated perceptions 
of threat in one’s environment. According to the authors, an adaptive fear structure includes a 
dangerous visual stimulus (e.g., “a real lion is snarling and running toward me”) a sympathetic 
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behavioral response (e.g., racing heart) and a correct evaluation of the situation (e.g., “the lion 
looks ready to attack me, I must escape”).  In contrast, a pathological fear structure contains 
faulty or biased network associations that involve exaggerated perceptions of threat. Thus, for 
example, for an individual with a pathological fear structure, an apparently benign stimulus (e.g., 
a photograph of a lion) might evoke a strong bodily reaction (e.g., racing heart) and incorrect or 
biased evaluation of threat potential (e.g., “the lion looks ready to attack me, I must escape”). 
Such biases in information processing may occur at multiple levels—encoding, consolidation, 
and/or retrieval—and may play a part in maintaining psychopathology by preventing adaptive 
information from penetrating and correcting the fear structure (Foa, Huppert & Cahill, 2006). 
Foa, Steketee, and Rothbaum (1989) suggested that pathological fear structures 
associated with traumatic events are salient to the development and maintenance of PTSD. For 
example, a woman who was raped at gunpoint by a man with a dark beard near a Shell gas 
station might form a new fear structure, in which she associates visual elements from the event 
(dark beard, gas station) with heightened physiological arousal and the possibility of rape or 
death. This fear structure, based on associations that will be erroneous under most circumstances, 
is likely to disrupt her previously-held notions of safety.  She may then begin to allocate more 
attentional resources toward scanning for potential threat cues in her environment and may 
interpret elements of her environment with greater, possibly unnecessary, caution. 
Thus, individuals with PTSD appear to process new information differently from peers 
without PTSD, in that they perceive mildly threatening or ostensibly benign stimuli as 
threatening.  Due to the existence of pathological cognitive frameworks (fear structures), stimuli 
that even slightly resemble the original trauma stimulus are likely to evoke exaggerated 
behavioral and cognitive responses, including hypervigilance and intrusive recollections of the 
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trauma. Visual cues appear to be especially salient triggers for fear structures in PTSD (Foa & 
Kozak, 1986); therefore biased attention to and processing of incoming visual information may 
be particularly relevant to post-traumatic psychopathology.    
Foa and colleagues’ emphasis on the role of biased perception and interpretation of visual 
cues in the development of PTSD is consistent with broader information-processing models of 
anxiety (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Taken as a group, these 
models contend that biases in attention toward, interpretation of, and response to threat cues 
characterize individuals with high levels of anxiety, particularly those with clinically significant 
symptoms.  Some models focus on early—pre-attentive and attentive—stages of processing 
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mathews, 1990; Mogg & Bradley, 1998); others 
highlight later, more elaborative aspects of threat-cue processing, such as cognitive appraisal and 
stimulus interpretation (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Because models that emphasize early information 
processing biases in anxiety are of particular relevance to the proposed study, we have 
emphasized these in the present review. Constans (2005)  provides a comprehensive review of 
models that emphasize later information processing in the development and maintenance of 
PTSD (Constans, 2005). 
Bias in Early Stages of Information Processing in Anxiety 
In contrast to the existing information processing research on PTSD, current theories of 
general anxiety have largely emphasized the relevance of early stages of information processing 
in anxious pathology. Theorists have examined how high trait anxious individuals differ from 
both low trait anxious and mood-disordered individuals, particularly in the way they allocate 
attentional resources toward incoming information. Similarly, clinical research findings have 
revealed clear biases in pre-attentive and attentive processes of patients with anxious pathology. 
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Several prominent theories are presented here, with a particular focus on the unique contributions 
of each toward understanding aspects of atypical early-stage information processing frequently 
observed in anxious individuals.     
 In one of the earliest information processing theories of anxiety, Mathews (Mathews, 
1990; Mathews, 1993) described anxiety as an affective state characterized by hypervigilance for 
threat cues. Such hypervigilance and associated “worry” are, according to this model, inherently 
adaptive, as they prepare individuals for escape and avoidance of potential danger. They become 
maladaptive, however, when they occur in the absence of actual threat.  
Those with “excessive worry” not only are overly sensitive to cues of threat in their 
environment, but also choose to attend to stimuli that are congruent with their pessimistic 
predictions about safety. Such biased attentional allocation can interfere with the individual’s 
ability to efficiently assign resources toward more productive activities. Mathews postulated that 
this bias toward threat cues may occur automatically or without the individual’s awareness, 
making it difficult for anxious individuals to attribute a clear cause to their feelings of impending 
danger (Mathews, 1990). Mathews (1990) also posited that this processing style distinguishes 
anxiety from mood disorders such as depression. Whereas anxious individuals are quick to 
assign priority toward detection of danger in the environment, depressed individuals fail to 
initiate goals or activities altogether, regardless of the presence or absence of motivating cues in 
the environment.      
Williams and colleagues (1988) put forth a similar model of the association between 
anxiety and biased attention toward threat cues. In this model, though, they suggest that an 
interaction between state and trait anxiety leads to greater allocation of attentional resources 
toward threat stimulus processing (Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). Thus, 
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individuals with anxious predispositions and high levels of psychosocial stress are more likely to 
develop an information-processing style biased toward attention to threat. Consistent with this 
idea, research comparing clinically anxious individuals, who frequently demonstrate a 
combination of state and trait anxiety, with non-anxious controls has largely revealed a 
processing bias in favor of threat-relevant stimuli in anxious participants (MacLeod, Mathews & 
Tata, 1986; Mogg, Mathews & Weinman, 1989; MacLeod &Mathews, 1991).  
Williams and colleagues (1988) also identified two cognitive mechanisms as instrumental 
in influencing the direction of attentional bias: the Affective Decision Mechanism (ADM) and 
Resource Allocation Mechanism (RAM). According to their model, information about a stimulus 
enters the ADM, which determines the level of threat. This decision is influenced by both the 
individual’s current emotional state and different aspects of the stimulus. The RAM then 
determines how to allocate attentional resources towards the incoming stimulus; this decision 
reflects the influence of the individual’s trait anxiety level. High trait anxious individuals will 
direct attention toward threat; low trait anxious individuals will direct attention away from threat. 
Research in non-clinical samples supports this hypothesis; MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) 
demonstrated that adults with both low and high trait anxiety demonstrated biases in visual 
attention that varied as a function of state anxiety. Specifically, under conditions of high state 
anxiety, low trait anxious individuals showed a bias away from threat cues, while high anxious 
individuals demonstrated a bias toward threat cues.      
Mogg and Bradley (1998) elaborated on Mathews’, Williams’, and others’ related models 
of early (pre-attentive and attentive) bias in anxiety, identifying two cognitive systems as 
critically important to the emergence of biases: the Valence Evaluation System (VES) and the 
Goal Engagement System (GES). The VES aids in determining the threat value of a stimulus; 
9 
 
 
this determination is strongly influenced by trait anxiety.  While an individual with low trait 
anxiety may perceive low threat value in a given negative stimulus, a high trait anxious 
individual may perceive the same stimulus as highly threatening. The GES then determines the 
action the individual should take—either orient to or ignore the threat. According to this system, 
subjective evaluation of threat interacts with trait level anxiety to produce an individual’s 
cognitive processing style; high trait anxious individuals often perceive mildly aversive cues as 
highly threatening, therefore, they are more likely to allocate more attentional resources toward 
them. The authors conclude by noting that such attention bias toward mild threat cues may be a 
marker of vulnerability to anxiety rather than an etiological agent for this pattern of symptoms.          
Consistent across theoretical models is the idea that anxiety relates to a distinctive style 
of information processing characterized by preferential or biased processing of threat-related 
cues. Additionally, theorists appear to agree that varied cognitive mechanisms interact to 
influence biased processing of threat-relevant cues. More specifically, systems involved in 
stimulus appraisal and attentional resource allocation are thought to play important roles.  
Attentional Bias in PTSD 
Although the theoretical literature regarding attentional biases and anxiety has focused 
primarily on general anxiety, attentional biases to threat-related stimuli have also been 
documented in adults with more specific types of anxiety, such as that associated with PTSD. In 
particular, it appears that trauma victims with PTSD demonstrate biases toward threatening 
stimuli that are relevant to their own traumatic experiences (for a review, see Buckley, Blanchard 
& Neill, 2000). These biases have been found on tasks that involve both subliminal and 
supraliminal presentation of stimuli, and thus may reflect both pre-attentive and attentive 
processes (Buckley, Blanchard & Neill, 2000). Evidence that attentional biases are associated 
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with PTSD is consistent with Foa and colleagues’ (1989) emotion processing theory of emotion 
in that these biases likely reflect activation of fear structures in response to salient visual stimuli 
(Foa, Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989). While these selective attentional patterns may be adaptive in 
the presence of threat, their persistence long after genuine threats have subsided can disrupt 
adequate processing of adaptive information and perpetuate anxious symptomatology.   
Researchers have typically used one of two cognitive paradigms to measure biases in 
attention to threat in individuals with PTSD: the emotional Stroop task and the dot probe task. 
Most studies to date have used modified versions of the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). 
During the Stroop task, a participant views a series of color names, each of which is printed in an 
incongruent color (e.g., the word “yellow” might be printed in green). The participant must 
rapidly name the colors of the words presented, inhibiting the tendency to read the words aloud.  
Longer delays in naming colors of target words in this task are interpreted as a measure of 
cognitive interference. In other words, the longer it takes a person to perform an ostensibly 
automatic task such as color naming, the more likely it is that he or she is allocating processing 
resources toward filtering out the interfering stimulus cue.   
PTSD researchers have modified this task to include words related to the traumas their 
participants have experienced, based on the idea that response latency to naming colors of 
trauma-related words vs. non-trauma-related words provides a measure of processing bias 
(Thrasher, Dalgleish & Yule, 1993). In some versions of these tasks, target stimuli have been 
presented subliminally (using masking techniques) to allow researchers to detect pre-attentive 
biases. Masking involves very brief presentation (generally 15 milliseconds or less) of a threat-
related word, which is quickly replaced by a string of letters (Buckley, Blanchard & Neill, 2000).  
While cognitive researchers generally regard masking as a reliable method for measuring pre-
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attentive processing, some have argued that the Stroop is not an appropriate task for 
disentangling pre-attentive and attentive processes because its lexical demands may inherently 
require selective attention and effortful semantic processing (Mogg and Bradley, 1998). 
Supraliminal versions of the task, in which threat-related words are presented long enough that 
participants can perceive and read them (typically 500 ms or longer), may thus be more useful in 
measuring later, more elaborative processes.        
Many studies that have used modified Stroop paradigms to examine attentional bias in 
individuals with PTSD have focused on veteran populations. McNally and colleagues (1990), for 
example, studied a group of traumatized combat veterans with and without PTSD. They found 
that the PTSD group, unlike the PTSD-free group, was slower to respond to supraliminally-
presented words relevant to the Vietnam War than to other types of emotional words (including 
positively-valenced words). The PTSD group was also significantly slower than other veterans to 
name war-related words. These findings have been interpreted as evidence that threat-relevant 
stimuli disrupted attention for members of the symptomatic group.  
These results are similar to those of other authors who have found extended response 
latencies for threat-related words in veteran populations (McNally, English & Lipke, 1993; 
Kaspi, McNally & Amir, 1995; Vrana, Roodman & Beckham, 1995). Vrana, Roodman, and 
Beckham (1995) found that Vietnam veterans with PTSD (versus those without PTSD) not only 
demonstrated slowed color naming with threat words but also showed a response bias for 
emotional words on a later free recall task, even after controlling for comorbid depression and 
medication use. They speculated that the observed recall bias may indicate that response 
latencies on the Stroop reflect attentional capture, rather than avoidance, of trauma-relevant 
stimuli in PTSD. 
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Stroop studies of non-veteran populations have yielded similar evidence of attentional 
biases in individuals with PTSD. Foa and colleagues (1991) found that rape victims with PTSD 
took significantly longer to name rape-related words on the Stroop task than did traumatized or 
nontraumatized controls. These findings are similar to those of Cassiday and colleagues (1992), 
who also studied rape survivors (Foa et al., 1991; Cassiday, McNally & Zeitlin, 1992). Thrasher, 
Dalgleish and Yule (1993) likewise found that ferry disaster survivors with more severe PTSD 
took longer than less severely affected peers to name trauma-specific, but not general, threat 
words. More recently, Vythilingham and colleagues (2007) used a modified version of the 
Stroop and found that participants with PTSD demonstrated significantly greater interference 
with threatening pictures (versus positive or neutral pictures) than traumatized controls and 
nontraumatized participants. These results provide further evidence of preferential attention to 
threat-relevant stimuli in individuals with posttraumatic pathology.    
In a study of adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse with current PTSD, some of 
whom had been revictimized later in life, Field and colleagues (2001) found that all participants 
demonstrated longer response latencies for threat-related words than for neutral words. They also 
found that revictimized participants demonstrated longer response latencies toward 
sexual/victimization words than did those who had not been revictimized. This study may 
provide evidence of a cognitive priming effect in those who have experienced childhood 
maltreatment; that is, those who have experienced emotional or physical insults earlier in life 
may be more vulnerable to negative cognitive sequelae following a later trauma. The authors 
speculated that these results were related to re-activation of earlier fear structures, which may 
serve to amplify the cognitive consequences of later trauma.  
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The dot probe or visual probe task (Mogg & Bradley, 1999) is another experimental 
paradigm that allows measurement of attentional bias toward and away from threat stimuli. In 
typical dot probe tasks, a series of images appears on a computer screen. First, a pair of stimuli, 
one neutral and one representing threat, appears for a brief duration (generally 500 to 1500 
milliseconds). Upon the offset of these images, a probe (an asterisk or set of dots) appears in 
place of one image. The viewer must quickly press a button that corresponds to the position of 
the probe on the screen (left versus right, horizontal versus vertical). Faster responses to probes 
that replace threatening stimuli are thought to reflect biases in visual attention toward threat cues; 
faster responses to probes that follow neutral stimuli reflect biases away from threat (Bryant & 
Harvey, 1997).  
The dot probe task offers some advantages over the Stroop task in measuring pre-
attentive and attentive processes in traumatized individuals. Unlike the Stroop, the dot probe task 
does not rely on interference to measure bias in attention allocation; rather, it uses response time 
to provide a more direct measure of visual attention (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). The dot probe also 
allows for examination of the direction of this attention: either toward or away from threat. 
Pictures (such as those of facial expressions) can be used as stimuli in the dot probe paradigm, 
eliminating the need for more effortful semantic processing that is often required in the Stroop 
task. The use of pictorial stimuli, such as human facial expressions, also has the advantage of 
providing a potentially more ecologically valid method of measuring attention bias in individuals 
who have suffered interpersonal trauma.  As such, the dot probe appears to be a more precise, 
directional measure of bias in visual attention than the Stroop, with the further advantage that it 
can be modified to include stimuli that are both ecologically valid and salient for a given 
population.   
14 
 
 
Researchers have administered variants of the dot probe task to individuals with PTSD in 
four published studies. In one study involving adult victims of motor vehicle accidents with 
clinical or subclinical levels of PTSD, Bryant and Harvey (1997) presented word pairs (one 
neutral/one threat-related or one neutral/one positive) to participants. They found that subjects 
with PTSD responded more quickly to probes that replaced words related to driving threat than 
to probes that replaced positive or neutral words, suggesting a bias to attend to threat cues 
(Bryant & Harvey 1997). In another study, Dalgleish and colleagues (2003) found that children 
and adolescents with Generalized Anxiety Disorder or PTSD (combined into one group) 
demonstrated a comparable bias toward threat-related words. Youth with depression and healthy 
controls, in contrast, did not show evidence of an attentional bias toward threat. While the dot 
probe is generally regarded as a valid measure of early-stage processing in anxious individuals, it 
may be difficult to determine whether increased response latencies reflect attentional capture or 
an inability to disengage from threat cues (Mathews et al., 2003). 
Elsesser, Sartory, and Tackenberg (2004, 2005) also administered variations of the dot 
probe to trauma victims and healthy controls in two recent studies that examined attention 
allocation and physiological reactivity to trauma-related stimuli. In the first (Elsesser et al., 
2004), the authors administered a modified version of the dot probe to healthy controls and 
survivors of a wide range of traumatic events (67% of whom had experienced recent trauma) 
with and without Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) or chronic PTSD. This version of the dot probe 
included unspecified “trauma-relevant,” “generally aversive,” and neutral pictures. Compared to 
healthy controls, trauma survivors with ASD demonstrated a tendency to direct their attention 
away from trauma-related pictures, and participants with chronic PTSD tended to direct their 
attention toward trauma-related pictures (Elsesser, Sartory & Tackenberg, 2004). These 
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differences were not statistically significant; one possible explanation for this may be that the 
threat stimuli the authors utilized were overly general with regard to the heterogeneous traumatic 
events experienced in this sample. 
 In their 2005 study, the authors administered a similar version of the dot probe to healthy 
controls and recent trauma survivors at two different time points (baseline and 3 months), and 
found that trauma survivors took significantly longer to respond to probes following trauma-
relevant pictures, in comparison to controls (Elsesser, Sartory & Tackenberg, 2005). 
Interestingly, attention bias scores indicated that trauma survivors tended to direct their attention 
away from threat cues at time one and toward threat cues at time two, while an opposite pattern 
was found in healthy controls. Findings from this study may bear more relevance to acute PTSD 
than to chronic lifetime PTSD, as only 20% of this sample demonstrated clinical post-traumatic 
pathology at time two. Indeed, it is possible that patterns of attention may differ between those 
who have experienced more versus less recent trauma. However, both studies demonstrate that 
visual attention may be differentially allocated in trauma survivors, and that tendencies to 
allocate attention away from or toward trauma-relevant stimuli may reflect acute or chronic post-
traumatic responses, respectively. 
In sum, research findings from these two different attentional paradigms—the modified 
Stroop and dot probe—have revealed evidence of an attention bias to threat cues in individuals 
with PTSD. While veterans have been most widely studied, other groups of trauma survivors 
with PTSD have also demonstrated a tendency to orient to cues of threat in lexically-based tasks. 
Bias toward and away from threat cues may be differentially apparent in survivors of acute and 
chronic trauma.  One study of individuals with PTSD who were maltreated in childhood showed 
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attention bias toward trauma-specific stimuli in a revictimized subgroup, suggesting potential 
cognitive priming effects. 
Impact of Early Life Trauma on Emotional Information Processing 
In accordance with multiple theories of anxiety and PTSD, evidence clearly indicates 
associations between pathological responses to trauma and distinctive, potentially maladaptive, 
patterns of attention to emotionally salient cues. Relatively little research however, has examined 
how the timing of trauma may influence this relationship. Considerable evidence, for example, 
suggests that trauma can have particularly pernicious effects on brain development, as well as 
cognitive, social, and emotional functioning, when it occurs during childhood (Salmon & Bryant, 
2002; Teicher et al., 1997). It thus is plausible that early trauma may relate distinctively to the 
ways in which individuals perceive and attend to emotionally salient cues. 
With regard to brain development, early childhood abuse has been hypothesized to 
produce dramatic alterations in endocrine and neurotransmitter systems, sensitizing affected 
children toward the later development of PTSD (Teicher et al., 1997). More specifically, the 
effects of early stress appear to be concentrated in regions of the brain that are involved in 
emotion processing. The amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex, which interact to contribute to 
the fear response and its modulation, show atypical patterns of structure and function in adults 
who were maltreated in childhood (De Bellis et al., 2002). At least one functional neuroimaging 
study of childhood abuse survivors with PTSD, for example, revealed altered brain blood flow in 
a brain region that participates in regulating amygdala activity when adult participants were 
exposed to scripts of their own early life abuse (Bremner et al., 1999). Thus, it appears that early 
childhood abuse may have detrimental consequences for brain structures involved with 
processing of incoming emotional information.    
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Maltreated children also appear to be highly vulnerable to deficits or delays in cognitive 
and social skills, which may be mediated at least partly by neural anomalies (Beers & De Bellis, 
2002; Cicchetti & Lynch, 1995). Trauma during periods when children’s emotion-regulation 
skills are maturing and their strategies for coping with emotions are limited may have especially 
profound effects (Salmon & Bryant, 2002).  For example, a longitudinal study by Erickson, 
Egeland and Pianta (1989) found that maltreated children demonstrated more anger, 
hyperactivity and aggression over time than non-maltreated children; cross-sectional studies of 
maltreated children have yielded similar results (Kaufman & Cicchetti, 1989; Alessandri, 1991; 
Haskett & Kistner, 1991). Cummings and colleagues (1994) found that physically abused boys 
demonstrated more aggression than non-abused boys when an experimental confederate 
expressed anger toward their mothers. Thus, maltreated children appear to be sensitized toward 
expressions of anger, which, in turn, can interfere with their adaptive social functioning (Pollak, 
Cicchetti & Klorman, 1998). 
Early trauma may lead to or amplify social-cognitive and emotional difficulties via two 
primary mechanisms. First, it may impair a child’s skill at accurately interpreting cues from adult 
caregivers. Because children often rely on adult caregivers to aid in their own emotional 
regulation, it is important that those adults use appropriate language and facial expressions to 
help the child interpret the situation (Eisenberg, 1998). Caregivers who are abusive may be less 
likely to model adaptive responses to negative emotion or to respond appropriately to others’ 
expressions of negative affect, thus impairing their children’s emotional and social development 
(Salmon & Bryant, 2002). Second, given children’s limited ability to encode information, 
immature verbal skills, and lack of experience, memories for early life trauma are prone to be 
poorly constructed and prone to misinterpretation (Vernberg & Varela, 2001; Salmon & Bryant, 
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2002).  Therefore, childhood maltreatment, especially if it is chronic, can lead to the 
development of a distorted and maladaptive emotion processing style that persists into adulthood 
(Vernberg & Varela, 2001). In particular, chronic exposure to threat in early life may prime 
individuals to search maladaptively for signs of threat, even when danger is minimal (Pollak, 
2003). 
Childhood Maltreatment and Processing of Emotion in Facial Expressions 
  Pollak and colleagues have generated an impressive number of studies that converge to 
suggest that attention to and perception of emotional cues such as facial expressions occur 
atypically in maltreated youth. Pollak has proposed that this atypical pattern of functioning 
reflects one way in which children adapt to unpredictable and frightening environments (Pollak, 
2003). More specifically, for children who live in unstable family environments where 
inconsistent emotional messages, angry threats, and violence are common, it may be adaptive to 
allocate attentional resources to identify potential threat in any incoming stimuli. Threatening 
facial expressions, which may have signaled impending violence in the past, may thus serve as 
particularly salient predictors of potential harm for individuals who have endured maltreatment 
and may be especially important to detect. Further, learning that threatening faces warrant 
immediate attention and response can significantly shape a child’s evaluation of social signals in 
the future (Pollak, 2003). While adaptive in the presence of threat, the persistence of this biased 
emotion processing style can impair an individual’s ability to attend to other salient emotional 
cues. As such, some researchers have noted that this style of emotion processing, when 
persistent, can increase risk for development of various types of psychopathology (Cicchetti & 
Toth, 1995). 
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 In support of the idea that child maltreatment is associated with atypical responses to 
facial threat, Pollak and colleagues have found differences between maltreated and non-
maltreated youth in their processing of angry faces at both behavioral and neural levels. In a 
behavioral study, Pollak and coworkers presented children with vignettes of a protagonist who 
experienced an emotional event (Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung & Reed, 2000). They then asked the 
children to identify which of five faces (happy, sad, angry, disgusted, fearful) best represented 
the protagonist’s likely feelings. The authors found that physically abused children, compared to 
neglected and non-maltreated peers, demonstrated a bias to select anger as their response.  
Other studies examining face emotion perception in abused children suggest heightened 
sensitivity toward anger in faces. Pollak and Kistler (2002) presented physically abused and non-
abused children with a facial expression discrimination task. Stimuli were drawn from several 
series of facial expressions that had been morphed along spectra from happy to fearful, happy to 
sad, angry to fearful, and angry to sad expressions. They thus represented either prototypical or 
subtle (in some cases highly ambiguous) exemplars of different emotions. The children were 
required to identify the expression (happy or sad, angry or sad, etc.) represented by faces drawn 
from various points in the emotional spectra. The authors found that abused children did not 
differ from non-abused peers in how they categorized expressions drawn from happy-fearful or 
happy-sad continua. However, they were more likely to categorize ambiguous facial expressions 
as angry in the angry-fearful and angry-sad continua than were non-abused children. In another 
study, Pollak and Sinha (2002) presented children with a series of facial expression images that 
progressively changed from highly degraded to clear and intact and asked them to label the 
expression as soon as they could identify it. They found that physically abused children were 
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able to identify angry expressions, but not other emotional expressions, more quickly and 
accurately than non-abused controls (Pollak & Sinha, 2002).   
Other studies from Pollak’s group have focused on neural responses to emotional cues. In 
one such study (Pollak, Cicchetti, Klorman & Brumaghim, 1997), they found evidence of 
increased brain activity measured via event-related potentials (ERPs), in physically abused 
children during exposure to angry faces. The abused children demonstrated an increase in P300 
ERP signals during the presentation of angry stimuli; this pattern is of interest, because P300 is 
considered a neural indicator of cognitive resource allocation toward salient stimuli. No such 
increases were apparent in non-maltreated controls (Pollak, Cicchetti, Klorman & Brumaghim, 
1997). A similar electrophysiological study (Pollak, Klorman, Thatcher & Cicchetti, 2001) found 
that maltreated children demonstrated stronger ERP signals to angry targets than happy or fearful 
targets. Maltreated children also more accurately labeled angry face stimuli than did controls. 
These studies further support the idea that abused children may respond preferentially at both 
neural and behavioral levels to threat-relevant stimuli.    
Although Pollak’s group has explored numerous aspects of facial expression processing 
in children with histories of maltreatment, they have not characterized participants in their 
studies in terms of psychopathology. To date, only two published studies have examined face 
emotion processing in children with post-traumatic pathology. Pine and colleagues (2005) found 
that maltreated children (most of whom were diagnosed with PTSD), unlike non-maltreated 
controls, demonstrated a bias away from threatening faces on the dot probe paradigm. Small 
group size, however, prevented comparisons between maltreated children with and without 
PTSD. More recently, Masten and colleagues (in press) found that maltreated children both with 
and without PTSD reacted more quickly than healthy controls to emotional faces, particularly 
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fearful faces, during an emotion labeling task (Masten, Guyer et al. in press). There were not 
enough maltreated participants in this study, however, without diagnoses of PTSD to compare 
performance between children with and without psychopathology. It is therefore unclear how the 
presence of PTSD symptoms related to patterns of performance in either study.   
In general, it appears that survivors of childhood maltreatment may be predisposed to 
biases in emotional processing of ecologically salient cues, such as facial expressions. 
Physiological data reveal patterns of neural sensitivity to angry facial threat cues in maltreated 
children. Survivors of childhood maltreatment may also overattend to potential threat when 
interpreting emotional meaning in faces, maintain broader definitions of what constitutes an 
angry face, and have more difficulty disengaging from angry stimuli. While such increased 
sensitivity toward threat cues may be adaptive when threat is ongoing, such preferential 
allocation of information processing resources may impair social-cognitive development at both 
neural and behavioral levels, potentially increasing individual vulnerability in at least a subset of 
traumatized individuals toward later psychopathology.   
Summary 
Childhood maltreatment appears to increase risk for later development of PTSD; 
however, this disabling disorder occurs in only a minority of individuals exposed to extreme life 
stressors. PTSD theorists posit that biased information-processing styles may play a role in the 
development of this disorder; many neuropsychological studies of adults with PTSD have 
yielded evidence of cognitive biases. However, such studies have generally focused on later, 
more effortful stages of information processing, such as explicit memory. Those studies that 
have examined early stages of processing, such as attention, frequently used the Stroop task, an 
instrument with inherent limitations in measuring visual attention processes. General anxiety 
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theorists have more frequently studied atypical early-stage processing in anxious individuals, and 
many have observed a bias in attention to cues of threat, particularly among high trait anxious 
individuals. Given the volume of existing information-processing research focused on PTSD and 
generally anxious populations, it is surprising that few studies have aimed to understand how 
early trauma may relate to the development of atypical information-processing styles and adult 
psychopathology. Early childhood abuse has been associated with neurological alterations that 
could affect processing of incoming emotional information and thus increase risk for emotional 
disorders; social learning theorists have also provided explanations of how maltreated children 
may acquire maladaptive ways of responding to emotional cues. Indeed, empirical evidence has 
indicated that abused children show greater sensitivity toward cues of threat in ecologically 
salient stimuli, such as human facial expressions. It appears crucial, then, to examine how 
atypical early-stage information-processing mechanisms may be associated with risk for later life 
pathology in survivors of childhood maltreatment. Given the substantiated empirical associations 
between PTSD and information-processing bias, and between childhood maltreatment and bias 
toward threat as presented in human facial expressions, we will examine whether bias toward 
threat mediates associations between childhood maltreatment history and the presence of PTSD 
symptoms in a sample of adults.      
Chapter 2: Methods 
Participants and Procedure  
Participants were recruited through an ongoing project at Emory University designed to 
examine risk factors for PTSD in a highly traumatized, low socioeconomic status, urban 
population. Participants were recruited from the general medical clinics of Grady Memorial 
Hospital, a publicly funded, not-for-profit healthcare system that serves economically 
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disadvantaged individuals in downtown Atlanta. Patients attending these clinics have been found 
to exhibit high rates of childhood maltreatment and post-traumatic symptoms that vary 
considerably in severity (Ressler et al., 2007).  
 Patients were deemed eligible for participation if they were able to give informed consent 
and understand English, as determined by a study researcher. Participants with current prominent 
suicidal ideations, medical conditions that contribute significantly to psychiatric symptoms (such 
as dementia), or a history of schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder as evaluated via the 
Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM (SCID; First, Spitzer et al. 1995) were excluded.  
 A total of 183 adult males and females aged 18-65 years participated in this study. Data 
for 54 of these participants, however, were excluded from analyses due to poor task performance 
(more than 20% skipped trials or errors) or age (greater than 60 years), yielding a final sample of 
129 participants. Demographics and clinical characteristics of the final sample are described in 
Table 1.  
 Participants in this sample were primarily female (72%; n=92) and African-American 
(89.9%; n=116) and were, on average, 39.5 years of age (SD=12.51). Most participants had 
obtained 12 years or fewer of education (60.5%; n=78) and reported household monthly incomes 
of less than $1000 (70.2%; n=87). One-third of the participants in this sample reported a 
previous diagnosis of depression (33.3%; n=43) and/or previous drug or alcohol abuse or 
dependence (34.6%; n=44); approximately 10% (n=14) of this sample reported a previous 
diagnosis of PTSD. On average, participants reported mild to moderate current depressive 
symptoms according to the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1996). 
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Measures 
 Dot Probe Task (Mogg & Bradley, 1999). The dot probe is a computerized behavioral 
task that requires participants to respond rapidly to a behavioral cue in the presence of distracting 
information that is emotional or neutral in nature. During each trial of the task, a pair of face 
photographs (both of the same actor) is presented for 500 milliseconds (ms).  After the offset of 
the face pair, an asterisk is presented in the location that one of the faces occupied. Participants 
indicate as quickly as possible with a forced-choice button press response whether the asterisk 
appears on the left- or right-hand side of the screen. In each face pair, one face displays an 
emotional expression (either threatening or happy) and the other a neutral expression. The task 
consists of 80 randomly ordered trials (32 positive-neutral face pairs, 32 neutral-threat face pairs, 
and 16 neutral-neutral face pairs). The probe replaces emotionally-valenced stimuli during half 
of the trials, and replaces neutral stimuli during the other half of the trials. During neutral-neutral 
trials, the probe appears on the left or right side of the screen an equal number of times.   
Emotion bias scores were calculated by subtracting response time to emotion-incongruent 
stimuli (probes that replace neutral pictures) from response time to emotion-congruent stimuli 
(probes that replace happy or threatening pictures). These bias scores can be further decomposed 
into threat and happy bias scores. Although this task has been widely used in experimental 
settings, no published data regarding reliability are available. Findings from prior research, 
however, suggest that the measure validly discriminates between anxious and non-anxious adults 
and youth (Bradley, Mogg et al. 1999; Wilson and MacLeod 2003; Mogg, Philippot et al. 2004; 
Pine, Mogg et al. 2005).  
 MPSS. The Modified PTSD Symptom Scale (MPSS; Falsetti, Resnick et al. 1993) is a 
brief self-report questionnaire with demonstrated diagnostic validity that was administered to 
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evaluate for presence and severity of PTSD symptomatology. The MPSS was administered 
orally by trained clinicians in order to avoid potential literacy problems common to the 
population under study. The MPSS assesses re-experiencing, avoidance, and arousal symptoms 
that have occurred in the 2 weeks prior to test administration. The MPSS includes items such as: 
“Have you had recurrent or intrusive distressing thoughts or recollections about the event(s)?” 
and “Have you persistently been making efforts to avoid activities, situations, or places that 
remind you of the event(s)?” Participants will be asked to rate frequency and severity of 18 such 
symptoms using a Likert-type scale. Frequency ratings range from 0 (not at all) to 3 (5 or more 
times per week/very much/almost always); severity ratings range from 0 (not at all distressing) to 
4 (extremely distressing). A final question assesses how long the symptoms have been present 
(<1 month to >1 year). Separate severity and frequency scores can be obtained from this measure 
(only frequency was used in this study), and scores can be classified as either dichotomous or 
continuous variables. Falsetti and colleagues (1993) report that on this 119-point scale, typical 
total scores for individuals with PTSD fall between 46 and 71 points. The MPSS has good 
concurrent validity with the PTSD module of the structured clinical interview for DSM-III-R 
(Falsetti et al., 1993). The MPSS also has adequate reliability; Foa and colleagues (1993) 
reported a Cronbach’s α of .91 for the total scale and a 1-month retest reliability of .74 (Foa et 
al., 1993). 
 CTQ. The Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ) is a 28-item self-report questionnaire 
that has shown acceptable reliability and validity in both clinical and community populations 
(Bernstein et al., 2003). Bernstein and colleagues (2003) found moderate levels of agreement 
between therapist observation ratings and CTQ scores (as high as .59 for physical abuse) and 
good internal consistency scores (physical abuse = 0.83 to 0.86, emotional abuse = 0.84 to 0.89, 
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and sexual abuse = 0.92 to 0.95). The CTQ has also shown adequate convergent validity in that 
its indices significantly correlate with another measure of childhood trauma, the Childhood 
Trauma Interview (Bernstein et al., 1994). The CTQ was administered orally by trained 
clinicians. The CTQ retrospectively measures frequency of childhood traumatic incidents 
classified into five categories: physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, physical neglect, 
and emotional neglect. Trauma frequency ratings are made on a 5-point Likert scale: never true, 
rarely true, sometimes true, often true, and always true. Items listed on the CTQ both directly and 
indirectly query abuse, with statements including “I believe that I was physically abused” and 
“People in my family hit me so hard that it left me with bruises or marks.” 
 TEI. The Traumatic Events Interview (TEI) is a clinician-administered questionnaire 
designed to assess number and type of traumatic incidents the participant has experienced 
throughout his or her lifetime. The TEI includes a total of 15 questions about a range of potential 
traumatic events, including “Have you experienced a sudden life-threatening illness?” and “Have 
you witnessed a family member or friend being attacked without a weapon?” For each question, 
the TEI queries frequency of occurrence, age at onset of the “worst” incident, feelings of terror, 
horror, and helplessness (rated on a 0-2 severity scale) at worst incident, and subjective feelings 
that self or another person may die or be seriously injured at worst incident (rated on a 0-2 
severity scale). The TEI was developed for the purposes of the parent project and collection of 
reliability and validity data is underway (Ressler et al., 2007).   
 ETI. The Early Trauma Inventory (ETI; Bremner, Vermetten & Mazure, 2000) is a 
clinician-administered interview created to assess occurrence of various types of childhood 
maltreatment. The ETI measures onset and frequency of three types of abuse—physical, 
emotional, and sexual—and also determines the most common perpetrator of the abuse. The ETI 
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has 32 total items, including questions such as, “Were you ever tied up or locked in a closet?” 
and “Did you ever experience someone rubbing their genitals against you?” The ETI has also 
shown good validity and reliability ratings; Bremner, Vermetten & Mazure (2000) reported an 
inter-rater reliability coefficient of .99, and the measure has demonstrated good validity when 
correlated with measures of psychopathology, such as the Civilian Mississippi Scale (r=.78) and 
trauma, such as the Checklist of Traumatic Events (r=.63).   
 DQ. The Experiences of Discrimination Questionnaire (DQ; Krieger et al., 2005) is a 
self-administered questionnaire designed to assess perceived racial discrimination. The 
Discrimination Questionnaire has a total of 28 questions that measure whether or not individuals 
have experienced racial discrimination within different settings (e.g. at school, while getting a 
job) and how frequently this discrimination may have occurred (i.e. once, two or three times, 
four or more times). Krieger and colleagues (2005) found good test-retest reliability coefficients 
(.70 and higher) and high correlations (up to .72) with indices of another measure of 
discrimination, the Williams Major and Everyday discrimination measure (Williams et al., 
1997). 
Data Analysis 
 Data were analyzed using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) multiple regression approach to 
assessing for the presence of mediator effects (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The diagram in Figure 1 
illustrates the model tested. First, CTQ scores were examined as a predictor of PTSD symptoms 
(as measured by the MPSS), to establish that there was an effect to mediate (path c). Second, 
CTQ scores were examined as a predictor of attention bias (path a). Once these paths were 
established, MPSS score (PTSD symptoms) was regressed on CTQ scores after controlling for 
the effects of attention bias (path b). If, after entering attention bias scores, an attenuated or 
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insignificant relationship exists between childhood maltreatment and attention bias, then PTSD 
symptoms may be seen as a mediator of the relationship between childhood maltreatment and 
attention bias. As Baron & Kenny (1986) caution, full mediation, in which the effects of path c 
are reduced to complete non-significance, is uncommon in psychological research. However, 
significant changes in regression coefficients when potential mediators are added to the model, 
as measured using the Sobel test, may provide a measure of the strength of the mediator (PTSD 
symptoms).  
Exploratory statistical analyses were also conducted to examine relationships among 
different types of childhood maltreatment (physical, sexual, and emotional), attention bias (for 
happy or threatening faces), and different clusters of PTSD symptoms (re-experiencing, 
avoidance and numbing, hyperarousal). One-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine 
associations of different types of childhood maltreatment, measured categorically, and attention 
bias; childhood maltreatment was measured both in terms of severity (absent versus severe) and 
number of types experienced (e.g., zero, one, two, or three types of emotional abuse 
experienced). Regression analyses were also conducted to investigate the effects of childhood 
maltreatment, attention bias, and PTSD symptomatology measured continuously. Given that 
many participants experienced multiple traumas in their lifetimes, TEI scores (which may 
influence attention bias scores) were entered as a covariate for all paths of analysis.    
Given that the dot probe face stimuli consisted largely of White faces while the majority 
of participants were African-American, and the presence of empirical evidence suggesting that 
race and racial attitudes can contribute to cognitive biases (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; 
Richeson & Trawalter, 2008), a separate set of exploratory regression analyses were conducted 
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to examine the influence of perceived racially discriminative experiences on participants’ 
attentional preference for different facial expressions.  
Power Analysis 
Sample size was determined based on a power analysis conducted using a computerized 
power calculator (Bakeman & McArthur, 1999). Prior research examining associations between 
attention bias and posttraumatic psychopathology in a sample of maltreated and non-maltreated 
children (Pine et al., 2005) yielded an effect size of d=-.58; effect size has ranged from d=.32 to 
d=-.46 in other research examining attention bias in adults with and without PTSD (Bryant & 
Harvey, 1997). In order to achieve an 80% probability of identifying effects of this size when 
childhood trauma scores and attention bias scores were examined as predictors of PTSD 
symptomatology and alpha was set at .05, a total sample size of at least 67 participants was 
required.  
Chapter 3: Results 
 
Mediational Analyses 
 
 Correlations between attention bias scores and indices of the CTQ and MPSS, as well as 
other clinical measures, are presented in Table 2. As predicted, all three types of childhood 
maltreatment, including sexual, physical, and emotional abuse (measured using the CTQ 
physical, sexual and emotional abuse subscales) correlated significantly and positively with the 
three clusters of PTSD symptoms (as measured by indices of the MPSS). CTQ total score (values 
calculated with mean substitution for missing data) was associated most strongly with PTSD 
hyperarousal symptoms as measured by the MPSS (r = .54, p<.01). While no statistically 
significant relationships were found between childhood maltreatment and attention bias for 
threatening faces, attention bias for happy faces was significantly and positively associated with 
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all childhood maltreatment types. The strongest association was found between happy bias 
scores and total incidence of childhood maltreatment (CTQ total score (r = .25, p<.01).  
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), mediational effects cannot be identified unless 
statistically significant associations exist among predictor and mediator variables (Path A), 
mediator and outcome variables (Path B), and predictor and outcome variables (Path C). For this 
study, we tested the statistical significance of associations between childhood maltreatment and 
attention bias (for threatening or happy faces, each examined separately) (Path A), attention bias 
and PTSD symptoms (Path B), and childhood maltreatment and PTSD symptoms (Path C). 
Statistically significant associations were found between attention bias for happy, but not 
threatening, faces and the other variables; therefore, mediational analyses were performed using 
only happy bias scores as the mediating variable (see Figure 1). 
As shown in Figure 2, total incidence of childhood maltreatment predicted a significant 
amount of variance in happy bias scores (Path A; Beta=.25, R square=.06, p<.01). Total 
incidence of childhood maltreatment also predicted 26.4% of the variance in total PTSD 
symptoms (Path C; Beta=.51, R square=.26, p<.01) Attention bias for happy faces did not show a 
statistically significant association with total PTSD symptomatology (r=.15, ns).  
However, a statistically significant association was found between attention bias for 
happy faces and PTSD avoidance and numbing symptoms (r=.19, p<.05).  Happy bias thus 
accounted for a statistically significant amount of variance in PTSD avoidance/numbing 
symptoms (Beta=.19, R square=.04, p<.05). Given these findings, the Path C analysis was 
repeated to examine associations between childhood maltreatment and PTSD 
avoidance/numbing symptoms specifically; total incidence of maltreatment explained 20.8% of 
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the variance in PTSD avoidance/numbing symptoms (Beta=.46, R square=.21, p<.01). Figure 3 
describes this alternate statistical model. 
Sobel’s test for indirect effects, which was used to test the statistical significance of 
attention bias as a mediating variable, yielded a value of 1.63 (p=.10) for the model in which 
PTSD avoidance and numbing symptoms served as the outcome variable. Thus, attention bias for 
happy faces was not found to be a statistically significant mediator of the relationship between 
childhood maltreatment and PTSD avoidance and numbing symptoms. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 A separate set of analyses was conducted to explore potential differences in attention bias 
among different groups of participants in this sample, namely, those with and without childhood 
abuse histories, and among participants with different types of abuse. 
Attention bias and severity of childhood maltreatment. One-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to examine potential differences in attention bias among participants who reported 
experiencing none, mild, moderate, or severe histories of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse on 
the CTQ. Post hoc Tukey’s tests of honestly significant difference were used to compare mean 
attention bias scores within each abuse severity subtype. As shown in Table 3, attention bias for 
happy faces did not differ significantly according to severity of childhood physical abuse, F(3, 
115)=.85, p > .05, or sexual abuse, F(3, 115)=2.02, p > .05 (see Table 4). However, significant 
differences in happy bias scores were evident for severity of emotional abuse, F(3, 115)= 2.92, p 
< .05 (see Table 5). Post hoc analyses indicated that participants who had experienced severe 
emotional abuse allocated their attention toward happy faces (Mean bias score=13.86, 
SD=26.03), while participants without a history of childhood emotional abuse demonstrated an 
attentional preference away from happy faces (Mean bias score=-9.41, SD=36.72). No 
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statistically significant associations were found between threat bias and severity of childhood 
maltreatment, measured categorically. 
Attention bias, childhood maltreatment, and adult trauma. Regression analyses were 
conducted to examine the unique contribution of childhood maltreatment to attention bias toward 
happy faces after accounting for the contributions of adult trauma. Total incidence of adult 
trauma contributed a significant amount of variance to happy bias scores (Beta=.25, R 
square=.06, p<.01); when added to this model, total incidence of childhood maltreatment also 
significantly contributed to the variance in happy bias scores (Beta=.16, R square=.08, p<.01). 
These results are detailed in Table 6. When examined individually, subtypes of childhood 
maltreatment (physical, sexual, and emotional maltreatment, measured continuously) were not 
statistically significant predictors of attention bias toward happy faces.  
Attention bias, trauma, and PTSD. Regression analyses were also conducted to 
investigate the relationship between attention bias and PTSD symptomatology after controlling 
for the effects of trauma. While total PTSD symptoms did not predict a significant amount of 
variance in attention bias toward happy faces (Beta=.15, R square=.02, ns), PTSD avoidance and 
numbing symptoms accounted for a significant amount of variance in happy bias scores 
(Beta=.19, R square=.04, p<.05); these findings are shown in Table 7. This relationship remained 
significant even after controlling for total amount of trauma experienced (Beta=.03, R 
square=.06, p<.05), or current depressive symptomatology, as measured by the BDI (Beta=.25, R 
square=.04, p=.05). Thus, it appears that attention bias toward happy faces may be associated 
with post-traumatic psychopathology, particularly avoidance and numbing symptoms.  
Childhood maltreatment, attention bias, racial discrimination, the interaction of attention 
bias and perceived racial discrimination, and PTSD. Finally, total incidence of childhood 
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maltreatment, perceived racially discriminative experiences, attention bias (for threatening or 
happy faces), and the interaction of attention bias and perceived racially discriminative 
experiences were entered hierarchically in a regression equation to examine the associations of 
these variables with PTSD symptomatology; total childhood maltreatment was entered at step 1, 
discriminative experiences entered at step 2, attention bias scores entered at step 3, and 
interaction of attention bias and perceived racial discrimination at step 4. Childhood 
maltreatment (Beta=.52) and perceived racially discriminative experiences (Beta=.18) together 
explained 35% of the variance in PTSD symptoms (p<.01). When added to this model, attention 
bias for threatening faces (Beta=.07) produced a significant R square change of.005; addition of 
the threat bias/perceived racial discrimination interaction term also produced a significant R 
square change (.041; see Table 8), and all four variables together accounted for 40% of the 
variance in PTSD symptoms (p<.01). The threat bias/racial discrimination interaction term 
(Beta=.331) accounted for more variance in total PTSD symptomology than threat bias or 
perceived racial discrimination examined independently. When added to the model at step 3, 
attention bias for happy faces (Beta=.06, R square=.354, p<.01) and the happy bias/racial 
discrimination interaction term (Beta=.26, R square=.384, p<.01; see Table 9) also improved the 
overall model significantly (R square changes of .004 at step 3 and .030 at step 4), although 
modestly. Therefore, it appears that the association between childhood maltreatment and PTSD 
symptoms in this sample may be complicated by both attentional and environmental factors, 
including attention bias and perceived experiences of racial discrimination. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
The findings from this study indicate a complex set of relationships among childhood 
maltreatment, early-stage information processing, and post-traumatic psychopathology in a 
sample of highly traumatized, economically disadvantaged adults, most of whom are members of 
an underserved racial minority group. Our primary analyses examined whether two types of 
attention bias (bias toward/away from threatening faces, bias toward/away from happy faces) 
mediated the association between childhood maltreatment and PTSD symptomatology. While 
neither type of attention bias was found to be a statistically significant mediator according to a 
conservative test of indirect effects (Sobel test; Baron & Kenny, 1986), regression analyses 
demonstrated that attention bias toward happy faces and total incidence of childhood 
maltreatment together explained more variance in PTSD avoidance and numbing symptoms than 
did childhood maltreatment alone. These effects were found to be significant even after 
controlling for current depressive symptomatology. Thus, attention bias and childhood 
maltreatment appear to have distinct associations with PTSD symptomatology, particularly, 
avoidance and numbing symptoms, in adulthood. 
Notably, the patterns of attentional allocation observed in this study diverged from those 
reported in many earlier studies, including studies of maltreated children and adults with PTSD 
(Bryant & Harvey 1997; Pollak, 2002). In particular, adult survivors of childhood sexual, 
physical, or emotional abuse did not demonstrate attentional preference for threatening faces, as 
was predicted based on prior findings in the literature. Rather, these participants, particularly 
individuals who had suffered frequent and severe emotional abuse, showed an attentional bias 
toward happy faces, relative to neutral faces, even when adult trauma and comorbid depression 
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were covaried. Likewise, incidence of traumatic events, including adult trauma measured in 
isolation, was significantly associated with attention bias toward happy faces.  
 This pattern of findings is surprising, given that attention bias toward positive social cues 
has been shown more typically to relate to adaptive emotion regulation. For example, Joorman 
and Gotlib (2007) found that healthy controls demonstrated a bias toward happy faces on the dot 
probe task, while depressed participants showed an attention bias toward sad faces. Indeed, 
findings from one study suggest that selective attention toward positive cues may even enhance 
emotional functioning in normative samples. Wadlinger and Isaacowitz (2008) found that 
training a group of undergraduate students to attend to positive cues led to shorter gaze duration 
toward subsequent negative stimuli. The authors discussed the value of attending selectively 
toward positive social cues while avoiding negative cues, and stated that this strategy may aid in 
elevating mood and sustaining positive affect.      
 One possible explanation for our ostensibly counterintuitive findings is that participants 
in the present study have learned to attend to positive cues as a means of coping with constant 
environmental adversity. The majority of participants in this study sample were poor, had had 
limited access to education, and reported frequently experiencing racial discrimination. 
Frequency of trauma in this sample was also higher than is typical in populations most widely 
studied in the PTSD information processing literature. Thus, selective attention for positive cues 
may be a necessary and fundamental skill that is required for survival in a challenging, 
frequently punitive, environment in which such positive feedback may be rare, particularly from 
racial majority group members, like those depicted in most of the study stimuli.  
 However, we found that this bias toward happy faces was also significantly associated 
with PTSD symptomatology, even after statistically controlling for the experience of trauma. 
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Notably, attention bias toward happy faces was associated with avoidance and numbing 
symptoms. Avoidance of trauma-related cues (both physical reminders and thoughts of the 
trauma) contributes significantly to the maintenance of PTSD by preventing affected individuals 
from confronting feared trauma stimuli and thus precludes learning to extinguish exaggerated 
fear responses (Rothbaum & Davis, 2003). Thus, our findings may suggest that selective 
attention for positive social cues could play a role in maintaining post-traumatic 
psychopathology. While an attentional preference for positive social cues be adaptive on a 
fundamental level, it is possible that by over-attending to these cues an individual may be 
avoiding other negatively-valenced environmental cues, thereby preventing emotional processing 
of these salient social signals. As such, this bias in early-stage information processing (even for 
positive social cues) could limit appropriate processing of all relevant environmental stimuli and 
promote inaccuracies in later stages of information processing, such as judgment. This tendency 
for individuals with PTSD symptomatology to over-respond to positive social cues could be 
biologically mediated; Armony and colleagues (2005) found that increases in amygdala 
responsivity to unmasked happy faces corresponded with increases in PTSD symptoms. 
However, whether selective attention for positive social cues represents a risk factor for PTSD or 
is part of PTSD sequelae remains unclear, due to the cross-sectional nature of this study. 
Interestingly, attention bias toward happy faces was not associated with intrusive and 
hyperarousal PTSD symptoms in our initial analyses, although more inclusive regression 
analyses (i.e., regression models that included perceived racial discrimination and childhood 
maltreatment) indicated associations with total PTSD symptomatology. It is possible that 
attentional bias toward happy cues is related to an emotionally avoidant style; specifically, 
individuals with these attentional tendencies may experience marked avoidance of physical 
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reminders of trauma more frequently than cognitive intrusions and hypervigilance.  Thus, 
individuals with this attentional bias may potentially benefit most from PTSD treatment that 
targets such avoidance, namely, in-vivo exposure therapy.        
Negative experiences that extend beyond severe trauma may also have influenced the 
pattern of findings in the present sample. In particular, perceived racial discrimination may be 
relevant to understanding patterns of attentional response to the White/Caucasian facial 
expressions in the dot probe task within our largely (90%) African-American sample. Because 
participants reported a large number of racially discriminative experiences, presumably at least 
some of which were at the hands of White/Caucasian individuals, White faces that don’t convey 
unambiguously positive cues (e.g., neutral or angry faces) could represent social threats. Thus, 
the use of a task that includes almost exclusively White/Caucasian stimuli may have led to 
biased results.  
Social cognitive studies indicate that race, and racial attitudes, can significantly influence 
performance on face processing tasks. On a basic level, identification of race in faces appears to 
occur before identification of other salient facial features. Montepare and Opeyo (2002) found, 
for example, that a sample of mostly White participants identified race more quickly than other 
aspects of photographed faces, such as age, gender, and facial expression. Additionally, 
cognitive research suggests an out-group homogeneity bias in face perception—that is, 
individuals tend to over-generalize features of individuals outside their own racial group and 
individuate features of in-group members (for a review, see Messick and Mackie, 1989). Racial 
attitudes also appear to influence face emotion categorization; Hugenberg and Bodenhausen 
(2003) found that White participants with higher implicit levels of prejudice perceived hostility 
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in African-American faces longer than in White faces when presented with a morphed hostile to 
happy face expression continuum.  
This cognitive bias may take different directions at earlier versus later stages of attention. 
Richeson and Trawalter (2008) administered the dot probe to a sample of White undergraduates, 
using both shorter (30ms) and longer (450ms) stimulus presentation times and neutral versus 
happy facial expressions from African-American and White actors. They found that participants 
who were externally motivated to respond nonprejudicially toward African-Americans tended to 
orient toward neutral African-American faces during shorter stimulus presentations, and away 
from neutral African-American faces during longer presentations; no attention bias was found for 
happy faces as a whole. Presumably, the neutral African-American faces were perceived to be 
more threatening than happy faces.  
Thus, it is possible that our findings reflect a similar effect, in which a history of racially 
discriminative experiences biased participants’ categorization of emotional cues displayed on 
White faces, such that they perceived even neutral faces as threatening. Such a categorization 
bias could then affect threat bias scores. Impaired discrimination between threatening and neutral 
emotional signals has been observed previously in individuals with PTSD; Felmingham and 
colleagues (2003) found that individuals with PTSD demonstrated similar ERPs to angry and 
neutral faces, while non-traumatized controls had distinctly different ERPs to these stimuli, 
leading the authors to conclude that the PTSD group had difficulty differentiating these 
emotional signals.  
While our findings did not indicate statistically significant associations between attention 
bias scores and discriminative experiences, we found that childhood maltreatment, racially 
discriminative experiences, attention bias, and the interaction of attention bias/perceived racial 
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discrimination together contributed to a statistically significant amount of variance in PTSD 
symptoms. As such, it appears that both extrapersonal (adverse childhood experiences, racial 
discrimination) and intrapersonal factors (attention bias) together strongly predict the incidence 
of PTSD psychopathology in this sample, which is not surprising given the complicated and 
frequently difficult life experiences of our participants. Interestingly, the interaction of attention 
bias toward threat and perceived racial discrimination accounted for more variance in total PTSD 
symptoms than threat bias or perceived racial discrimination alone, indicating that the effects of 
each of these variables may amplify the other. These findings suggest that individuals who are 
generally sensitized toward perceiving hostility in their environment may be more susceptible 
toward the development of posttraumatic psychopathology after trauma; further exploration of 
the relationship between perceived race-related threat and attention bias for threatening 
emotional cues would be a worthwhile endeavor in future research. 
Several study limitations are worth noting. First, it is possible that our statistical methods 
were too conservative to allow us to detect statistical significance of attention bias as a mediator. 
More liberal methods, such as bootstrapping, could have detected significance in mediational 
effects (Chernick, 1999). Also, given that dot probe stimuli consisted largely of White faces, and 
that our study sample was primarily African-American, our results could reflect the influence of 
variables, such as demographic features, that extend beyond the target variables under study. 
Replication of the present study with a more diverse dot probe face stimulus set would be helpful 
to address potential confounding effects of viewing other-race faces and racial discrimination on 
attention bias, particularly threat bias. The attentional patterns we observed may be 
demographically mediated; it is possible that completely different attentional tendencies could 
emerge in a population with markedly different demographic characteristics. Similarly, the 
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happy face bias we observed may actually be adaptive for our study participants, for whom 
environmental adversity is frequent—attending to positive social cues may, in fact, be associated 
with resilience.  Finally, the attentional patterns we observed may have been a reflection of 
stimulus duration; it is possible that shorter (subliminal) or longer (overt) stimulus presentations 
could elicit distinctly different patterns of attention allocation.  
The data reported here indicate that biases in early-stage information processing partially 
mediate the relationship between childhood maltreatment and some aspects of PTSD 
symptomatology in our highly traumatized and underprivileged sample. Further studies of 
individuals with similar demographic characteristics are warranted to better differentiate 
information-processing mechanisms of psychopathology and resilience for this unique 
population. The use of a more diverse dot probe face stimulus set and different stimulus onset 
times can address potential threats to ecological validity and better differentiate attentional 
patterns at different stages of processing. Psychophysiological methods, such as 
electroencephalography (EEG) and fMRI can also address underlying biological mechanisms of 
these processes. 
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Appendix A: Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Attention Bias as a Mediator of the Relationship Between Childhood Maltreatment  
 and PTSD 
50 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Attention bias for happy faces as a mediator of the relationship between childhood 
51 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Attention bias for happy faces as a mediator of the relationship between childhood  
    maltreatment and PTSD avoidance and numbing symptoms 
Attention Bias 
for happy faces 
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Figure 4. Interaction of perceived racial discrimination and threat bias is significantly associated  
    with total PTSD symptoms 
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
 
Table 1.  
 
Demographics and Clinical Characteristics 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Female Male Total 
 
Age mean (SD) 
 
38.61 (12.47)
 
40.9 (12.41) 39.5 (12.51)
Race  
     African American or Black 82 (89.1%) 32 (91.4%) 116 (89.9%)
     Caucasian or White 7 (7.6%) 3 (8.6%) 10 (7.8%)
     Other 3 (3.3%) 0 3 (2.4%)
Education  
     < 12th grade 22 (23.9%) 6 (17.1%) 30 (23.3%)
     12th grade or GED 32 (34.8%) 16 (45.7%) 48 (37.2%)
     some college or tech school 22 (23.9%) 7 (20.0%) 29 (22.5%)
     college or tech school graduate 16 (17.4%) 5 (14.3%) 21 (16.3%)
     graduate school 0 1 (2.9%) 1 (0.8%)
Household monthly income  
     $0 - $249 22 (25.3%) 11 (31.4%) 34 (27.4%)
     $250 - $499 9 (10.3%) 4 (11.4%) 13 (10.5%)
     $500 - $999 28 (32.2%) 12 (34.3%) 40 (32.3%)
     $1000 - $1999 19 (21.8%) 4 (11.4%) 24 (19.4%)
     $2000+ 9 (10.3%) 4 (11.4%) 13 (10.5%)
Previous psychiatric 
hospitalization 
16 (17.4%) 8 (22.9%) 24 (18.6%)
Previous PTSD diagnosis 12 (13.0%) 2 (5.7%) 14 (10.9%)
Previous depression diagnosis 37 (40.2%) 6 (17.1%) 43 (33.3%)
Past drug or alcohol 
abuse/dependence 
25 (27.2%) 17 (50.0%) 44 (34.6%)
Current substance 
abuse/dependence 
5 (5.4%) 3 (8.6%) 10 (7.8%)
CTQ total score – Mean (SD) 43.99 (22.81) 40.80 (18.02) 42.94 (21.41)
TEI total trauma incidence 3.82 (3.68) 4.10 (3.11) 3.93 (3.52)
TEI trauma incidence in adulthood 2.95 (2.76) 3.57 (2.46) 3.12 (2.68)
PSS total 13.01 (12.16) 14.97 (12.88) 13.63 (12.33)
BDI total score 15.11 (12.88) 11.52 (10.88) 14.10 (12.38)
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Table 2.  
 
Intercorrelations Among Attention Bias Scores and Clinical Measures 
 
          2       3       4       5       6        7        8        9       10       11        12       13 
 
1. Threat Bias         -.01    -.13     -.10    -.10    -.11     -.11      -.06      -.13      -.12        -.04       -.14        .04 
 
2. Happy Bias                .25**   .20*   .23*    .22*    .15       .13       .19*      .07        .07        -.01        .14   
 
3. CTQ Total                .78*   .88**  .93**  .51**   .40**   .46**    .54**    .45**     .26**     .24* 
 
4. CTQ Sexual Abuse                  .59**  .66**  .37**   .27**   .32**    .42**    .35**     .31**     .08 
 
5. CTQ Physical Abuse                                .81**   .49**   .44**  .42**    .48**     .41**    .25*       .21 
            
6. CTQ Emotional Abuse                                       .52**   .41**  .46**    .56**     .52**    .26**     .31** 
 
7. PSS Total       .85**   .94**    .89**     .69**    .40**     .26**  
 
8. PSS Intrusive Symptoms               .69**    .66**     .51**    .31**     .09 
 
9. PSS Avoidance/Numbing               .75**     .66**    .33**     .30** 
 
10.  PSS Hyperarousal                      .66**    .47**    .25** 
 
11. BDI Total                  .43**    .28** 
 
12. DES Total †                    .03 
  
13. Discrimination Questionnaire                   __ 
      (number of types experienced) 
 
 
†  Dissociative Experiences Scale 
* p <.05 
** p <.01 
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Table 3.  
 
Childhood physical abuse is not associated with attention bias for happy faces 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Childhood physical abuse  
 
N Mean attention bias 
score (SD) 
 
 
None 
 
65 
 
-10.75 (34.47) 
 
Mild 
 
19 
 
.36  (34.69) 
 
Moderate 
 
13 
 
-4.37 (28.89) 
 
Severe 
 
22 
 
.03 (37.73) 
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Table 4.  
 
Childhood sexual abuse is not associated with attention bias for happy faces 
     
 
Childhood sexual abuse  
 
N 
 
Mean attention bias 
score (SD) 
 
      
None 76 -11.70 (34.56) 
      
Mild 9 9.09 (48.18) 
      
Moderate 13 -3.08 (26.16) 
      
Severe 21 4.75 (29.40) 
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Table 5.  
 
Attention bias for happy faces is associated with severe childhood emotional abuse 
 
 
Childhood emotional abuse  N Mean attention bias 
score (SD) 
 
 
None 
 
66 
 
-9.41 (36.72) 
 
Mild 
 
22 
 
-11.81 (25.37) 
 
Moderate 
 
11 
 
-13.12 (40.92) 
 
Severe 
 
20 
 
13.86 (26.03) 
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Table 6.  
 
Childhood maltreatment predicts attention bias toward happy faces 
 
 
    N Beta P R square 
 
 
Step 1 
 
TEI total adult 
trauma 
 
 
113 
 
.25 
 
.007 
 
.06 
Step 2 TEI total adult 
trauma 
113 .17 .13 
  CTQ total 113 .16 .15 
 
.08 
 
 
*Dependent variable = happy bias     
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Table 7.  
 
PTSD avoidance and numbing symptoms predict attention bias toward happy faces 
 
 
    N Beta P R square 
 
 
Step 1 
 
TEI total trauma 
 
116 
 
.24 
 
.011 
 
.06 
 
Step 2 TEI total trauma 116 .16 .15 
  PTSD avoidance 
and numbing 
116 .14 .20 
.07 
 
*Dependent variable = happy bias     
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Table 8.  
 
Childhood maltreatment, perceived racial discrimination, attention bias for 
threatening faces and the interaction between perceived racial discrimination and 
threat bias predicts total PTSD symptoms 
 
 
    N Beta P R square 
 
 
Step 1 
 
CTQ total 
 
80 
 
.56 
 
.000 
 
.32 
 
Step 2 
 
CTQ total 
 
80 
 
.52 
 
.000 
  Amount of racial 
discrimination 
experienced 
80 .18 .05 
 
.35 
 
Step 3 
 
CTQ total 
 
80 
 
.54 
 
.000 
  Amount of racial 
discrimination 
experienced 
80 .18 .06 
  
 
Step 4      
Threat bias 
 
CTQ total 
Amount of racial 
discrimination 
experienced 
 
Threat bias 
 
Threat 
bias/Discrimination 
interaction 
80 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
80 
.07 
 
.55 
.17 
 
 
 
-.19 
 
.33 
.45 
 
.000 
.08 
 
 
 
.20 
 
.03 
 
 
.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.40 
 
 
*Dependent variable = total PTSD symptoms    
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Table 9.  
 
Childhood maltreatment, racial discrimination and attention bias for happy faces predicts total 
PTSD symptoms 
 
 
    N Beta P R square 
  
 
Step 1 
 
CTQ total 
 
80 
 
.56 
 
.000 
 
.32  
 
Step 2 
 
CTQ total 
 
80 
 
.52 
 
.000 
  
.35  
  Amount of racial 
discrimination 
experienced 
80 .18 .05  
 
 
Step 3 
 
CTQ total 
 
80 
 
.52 
 
.000 
 
.35  
   
Amount of racial 
discrimination 
experienced 
 
80 
 
.18 
 
.07 
  
 
  
 
 
Step 4 
 
Happy bias 
 
CTQ total 
 
Amount of racial 
discrimination 
experienced 
 
Happy bias 
 
Happy 
bias/Discrimination 
interaction 
 
 
80 
 
80 
 
80 
 
 
 
80 
 
80 
 
.06 
 
.52 
 
.19 
 
 
 
-.13 
 
.26 
 
 
 
.52 
 
.000 
 
.05 
 
 
 
.35 
 
.06 
 
 
 
.38 
 
 
 
 
*Dependent variable = total PTSD symptoms     
 
